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Abstract 
 
 
The paper estimates McCallum and Taylor monetary policy reaction functions, and hybrids mixing 
instruments and targets from the two frameworks, for 20 e merging market economies. McCallum-
Taylor specifications with an interest rate instrument and a nominal income gap target perform bet-
ter than benchmark Taylor rules in describing monetary policy in inflation targeting economies. Es-
timating reaction functions for economies operating monetary and exchange rate targeting regimes 
produces mixed results, often revealing a lean with the wind behaviour. Instrument smoothing is a 
feature in the monetary base and in the interest rate reaction functions, but the exchange rate is not 
consistently s ignificant. The r esults f rom the  econometric analysis a re r obust to using a lternative 
estimators.  
JEL classification: E52, E58; F41. 
Keywords: McCallum and Taylor rules; nom inal f eedback r ule; m onetary pol icy; inf lation 
 targeting; emerging markets. 
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Tiivistelmä 
 
Tutkimuksessa e stimoidaan McCallumin ja T aylorin rahapolitiikkasäännöt ka hdellekymmenelle 
kehittyvälle taloudelle. Työssä käsitellään myös hybridejä sääntöjä, joissa yhdistetään instrumentti- 
ja ta voitemuuttujia ka hdesta e ri s äännöstä. McCallumin-Taylorin h ybridi s ääntö, j ossa ke skus-
pankin käytössä on korkoinstrumentti ja nimellistulotavoite, kuvaa inflaatiotavoitteen asettaneiden 
talouksien rahapolitiikkaa pa remmin kui n pe rinteinen T aylorin s ääntö. E stimointitulokset r a-
hamäärä- tai va luuttakurssitavoitteen asettaneille ma alle ova t va ihtelevia, ja ni iden mukaan ra-
hapolitiikkakäyttäytyminen on us ein tuuleen nojaavaa. Instrumentin tasoittamista ilmenee sekä pe-
rusraha- ja ko rkoreaktiofunktioissa, mutta keskuspankin reaktio va luuttakurssin muutoksiin e i ol e 
kaikkien maiden kohdalla tilastollisesti merkittävä. Ekonometrisen analyysin tulokset ovat robusteja 
erilaisista estimointimenetelmistä riippumatta. 
 
Avainsanat: M cCallumin ja T aylorin säännöt, nimellinen palautesääntö, r ahapolitiikka, inflaatio-
tavoite, kehittyvät taloudet.    
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1 Introduction  
 
The policy strategy central banks in emerging economies follow can at times be difficult to follow 
(e.g., Calvo and Mishkin, 2003) . In emerging e conomies f ragile i nstitutions, l ack of  central bank 
independence, a nd a  s carcity o f m onetary i nstruments c an r ender m onetary c ontrol di fficult. But 
following the crises in the 1990s many emerging market economies have been making considerable 
efforts to improve policy making institutions and empirical evidence could help in determining how 
central b anks r eact to fundamental e conomic de velopments. Empirically e stimated reaction func-
tions can provide valuable information for discussing monetary policy and therefore may ultimately 
help in safeguarding macroeconomic stability. 
The paper contributes by investigating monetary policy behaviour in 20 e merging market 
economies. T he i nvestigation s eeks t o a nswer t he f ollowing q uestions: A re T aylor-type, i nterest 
rate, monetary pol icy reaction functions useful for understanding monetary pol icy performance in 
inflation targeting economies? Can McCallum-type, monetary base, reaction functions help in char-
acterizing central bank policy in economies operating monetary targeting and exchange rate target-
ing pol icy s trategies? For economies with a dearth of s tatistical information on the real economy 
and relatively low levels of institutional development, can a nominal monetary policy feedback rule 
embodying an inflation targeting mechanism approximate historical monetary policy conduct? 
Understanding monetary policy behaviour in relation to the prescriptions of key analytical 
frameworks is relevant. John B. Taylor argues that the 2008 f inancial crisis is at least partly to be 
blamed on a loose United States Federal Reserve monetary policy stance in comparison to the pre-
scriptions of the Taylor rule (see also Billi, 2009). In a Wall Street Journal article Taylor writes (9 
February 2009, page A19):  
 
Monetary excesses were the main cause of the boom. The Fed held its target interest rate, 
especially in 2003-2005, well below known monetary guidelines that say that good policy 
should be based on historical experience. Keeping interest rates on the track that worked 
well in the past two decades, rather than keeping rates so low, would have prevented the 
boom and the bust. 
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The paper seeks to produce evidence about past monetary policy behaviour by estimating a 
family of reaction functions deriving from McCallum’s (e.g., 1988, 1999) and Taylor’s (e.g., 1993, 
1999) c ontributions. T he r elevant e mpirical l iterature on emerging economies of ten a dopts a 
framework without exercising judgment about which reaction function is adequate on t he basis of 
the declared monetary policy regime and institutional idiosyncrasies. The investigation tackles that 
shortcoming by assembling a record of monetary policy institutions in 20 emerging markets which 
informs the subsequent empirical modelling.  
The lite rature inve stigating m onetary pol icy r eaction f unctions us es m uch s ophistication 
(e.g., Dolado et al, 2005), but Kozicki (1999) argues that to be useful an empirical rule should be 
robust to minor variations. The s trategy of  the paper involves estimating benchmark, comparable, 
specifications using conventional econometric estimators to gain a better understanding of monetary 
policy i n emerging market economies. Following McCallum (2000), t he analysis runs a  range o f 
policy feedback rules in determining if the estimated central bank reactions are different depending 
on the type of instruments and targets considered for each economy. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives an account of developments in 
monetary policy institutions in emerging market economies. Section 3 explains the monetary policy 
frameworks used in the empirical modelling. Section 4 describes the time series data and the family 
of monetary policy reaction functions. Section 5 runs the battery of reaction functions deriving from 
McCallum’s and Taylor’s contributions, and discusses the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2  Monetary policy in emerging market economies 
 
Monetary pol icy i n e merging m arkets, a s i n a dvanced economies ( Bernanke e t al, 1999) , ha s 
evolved f rom monetary targeting and exchange r ate pe gging to i nflation targeting (e.g., Mishkin, 
2000). B ut emerging c ountries f ace m any obs tacles i n c onsolidating m onetary pol icy. Fry et a l 
(1996) e xamine 44 d eveloping c ountries a nd s how t hat c entral ba nks i n t he s ample are m oving 
away from traditional monetary instruments towards a marked-based monetary policy implementa-
tion. In that process monetary authorities face serious obstacles, like underdeveloped and inefficient 
financial s ystems, a nd f iscal dom inance. D espite t he pos itive de velopments, Fry e t a l a rgue tha t 
central banks in developing countries have been ineffective in fulfilling the key mandate of deliver-
ing pr ice s tability. M uch ha s be en m ade a bout t he t ransition t o a  m arked-based m onetary pol icy 
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strategy, but comparable empirical estimates t hrowing l ight on t he actual pol icy behaviour i n t he 
reforming countries are in short supply.  
This pa per doc uments m onetary pol icy i nstitutions i n 20  e merging m arkets a nd T able 1  
displays key information. The sample includes countries from Africa, Asia, Emerging Europe, and 
Latin America; Table A1 lists all the economies. The sample is also diverse in terms of ranking in 
World B ank i ncome t ables. T he group i ncludes c ountries t hat a re c lassified a s l ow i ncome l ike 
Ghana; lower middle income like the Philippines; upper middle income like Chile; and high income 
like the Czech Republic. Most countries in the sample are small-open-economies: twelve economies 
displayed trade-to-GDP ratios above 80% in 2007.1
In terms of  mone tary p olicy s trategies, 14 countries ope rate inf lation targeting r egimes, 
while 6 pur sue m onetary targeting or  e xchange r ate t argeting. T he i nflation t argeting c ountries 
adopted the strategy in the 1990s or 2000s, and the full implementation of the approach was some-
times preceded by implicit inflation targeting (see Carare and Stone, 2006). Some economies in the 
sample temporarily imposed capital controls in the 1990s, with implications for the link between the 
domestic interest rate, exchange rate, and capital f lows, and hence for e stimated monetary pol icy 
reaction functions.
  
2
Credibility of the monetary authorities with the general public, which is related to formal 
central bank independence (e.g., de Haan et al, 2008; Arnone et al, 2009), allowed central banks to 
plan and implement a strategy specifying a target for inflation. The disinflationary macroeconomic 
environment dur ing t he 1990s  a rguably f acilitated r educing t he pr e-announced i nflation t argets 
from double to single digits in the 2000s; by the end of the sample most inflation targeting countries 
had midpoint targets around 3%.
 However, excepting 2000 for Colombia and 2001 for Malaysia, all the episodes 
fall outside the sample period.  
3
                                                 
1 According to data from the World Bank Development Indicators Database.  
 Whether good policy or good luck was responsible for the Great 
Moderation and the good economic performance during the 1990s and early 2000s is a topic of on-
going debate (e.g., Galí and Gambetti, 2009). 
2 Countries with controls on inflows include Chile (1991-98), Colombia (1993-00), Malaysia (1994), Czech Republic 
(1995), Thailand (1995-97), Hungary (1996, 1999) and the Philippines (2000). Controls on outflows were imposed by 
Venezuela (1994-96), Thailand (1997-98) and Malaysia (1997-01). See International Monetary Fund (2005), p. 44.  
3 The numbers are consistent with inflation targets in the advanced economies of around 2%, considering the existence 
of Balassa-Samuelson effects that push inflation in non-tradables in emerging countries slightly higher than in advanced 
economies. See Mihaljek and Klau (2008) for recent evidence about the magnitude of the Balassa-Samuelson effect for 
Emerging Europe. Khan and Senhadji (2001) find that the threshold at which inflation rates begin to have a  negative 
impact on growth is higher for developing than developed countries.    
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The sample of countries includes successful reforming economies in Latin America. The 
1980s brought adverse financial conditions affecting already weak economies across Latin America. 
But major efforts have been made from the beginning of the 1990s to improve policy making, and 
countries have been choosing f rom several opt ions for conducting monetary pol icy (Mishkin and 
Savastano, 2001). The countries have opted to adopt a full range of polices, including inflation tar-
geting, monetary targeting, and exchange rate targeting. 
Chile g ranted i ndependence t o i ts c entral ba nk i n 1989. A longside c ame a  m andate f or 
adopting i nflation a s m onetary pol icy’s main obj ective. In 1990 a m ore formal m onetary pol icy 
stance was signalled by announcing an inflation target range for 1991. But from the mid-1980s until 
August 1999 the Central Bank of Chile also pursued an exchange rate band regime. Following the 
formal introduction of inflation targeting the authorities have always made clear that their primary 
objective is achieving the pre-announced inflation target, and from 1999 inflation is the primary ob-
jective of the Central Bank of Chile. 
 Colombia has also advanced significantly by granting independence to its central bank 
and operating an inflation targeting strategy since 1999. Otero and Ramírez (2006) investigate Co-
lombia’s move in 1991 towards a more independent monetary policy by granting greater autonomy 
to its central bank. They show that in Colombia’s case greater independence has led to a better out-
come regarding the central bank’s mandate of achieving price stability. 
Mexico is making substantial efforts in trying to consolidate sound policy institutions and 
has met with a fair amount of success: Cecchetti et al (2000) show that monetary policy in Mexico 
became more efficient, as measured by the lower variability of inflation and output, from 1991 on-
wards. And since 1999 Mexico is following a formal inflation targeting strategy. Still, Mexico had 
been pursuing its policy objectives using an unconventional quantitative target-based policy named 
‘El corto’. From 2008 Mexico shifted to a more conventional policy targeting a short term interest 
rate.  
Peru ha s a lso be en s trengthening m onetary pol icy i nstitutions a nd i mplements i nflation 
targeting since 2002. In Peru dollarization is a problem and building credibility is challenging. Uru-
guay also has a history of dollarization, and has not implemented a full inflation targeting strategy. 
Uruguay operates a flexible exchange rate regime. Costa Rica follows a mixed strategy of monetary 
targeting and exchange rate targeting. A further interesting case in Latin America is Venezuela. The 
central bank has legal mandate to pursue an inflation targeting strategy, but Venezuela in fact oper-
ates a regime mixing monetary and inflation targets. 
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Countries i n E merging Europe ha ve a lso be en working t owards bui lding s olid m onetary 
policy ma king ins titutions. Economies like  the  Czech R epublic, H ungary, and P oland ha ve b een 
fostering central banks with adequate independence for pursuing clear policy goals, as documented 
by C ukierman e t a l ( 2002). Inflation t argeting is t he m onetary pol icy framework i n t he t hree 
economies. The Czech Republic adopted inflation targeting in December 1997, Poland followed in 
1999, and Hungary moved to inflation targeting in June 2001. Jonas and Mishkin (2003) analyse 
inflation t argeting in t he Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, hi ghlighting past challenges and  
future prospects. All three economies aim to join the euro area, and e.g. an inflation target of 2% is 
announced to be in effect in the Czech Republic from January 2010 onwards until euro area acces-
sion.    
Asian economies provide relevant case studies, not least because in the 1990s crises start-
ing in the region spread to emerging markets across the world. Thailand is a  prominent example. 
During the late 1980s Thailand received a large amount of capital inflows. The development led to 
inflationary pressures that became a t hreat to macroeconomic stability. The imbalances were con-
tained until the early 1990s but were at least partly responsible for the economy’s downfall later in 
the decade. Following the Asian crisis, Thailand adopted inflation targeting in 2000. 
Malaysia has pr ice s tability as pr imary objective, but does not  have an explicit inf lation 
targeting framework. Malaysia operates a managed float exchange rate regime and has been able to 
keep inflation under control.  In the 1990s the Philippines gave independence to monetary pol icy 
and from 2002 implements inflation targeting. 
The study investigates economies in Africa, a region that is less prominent for overall eco-
nomic progress and institutional development. Some countries in Africa have been advancing more 
quickly. South Africa has been formally announcing inflation targets since 2002. The approach de-
mands hard-to-gain fiscal soundness, but lends credibility to the government’s commitment to mac-
roeconomic stability.  
In other African countries monetary policy has also improved. Countries like Ghana have 
been fostering good pol icy institutions, and moved to a  full-fledged inflation targeting s trategy in  
2007. After many years of pursuing monetary targeting Nigeria is also moving towards a marked-
based monetary policy strategy. That is also the case with Tunisia, a country considering adopting 
inflation targeting. But there are obstacles to progress in monetary policy in countries like Ghana, 
Nigeria, and Tunisia. For instance, doubts about the effectiveness of the transmission mechanism of 
Aaron Mehrotra and José R. Sánchez-Fung 
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monetary pol icy and the de gree o f pa ss t hrough f rom t he ex change r ate t o prices r aise con cerns 
about the viability of implementing market-based monetary policy strategies like inflation targeting.    
There is a difference between what countries say and what countries can and actually do. 
And that is important for understanding the potential benefits of pursuing a policy strategy. Because 
of that reason, gaining a better understanding about monetary policy by empirically estimating reac-
tion functions can help in ascertaining what countries actually do a nd the extent to which the per-
formance approximates a rule-like behaviour.  
The next section explains the frameworks informing the subsequent empirical modelling of 
central bank behaviour across emerging market economies.  
 
 
3 Frameworks for understanding monetary policy behaviour 
 
3.1 McCallum’s rule 
 
McCallum’s (e.g., 1988) work on monetary base rules is an example of a nominal feedback mecha-
nism. The rule is  
 
*
1 1( )
a
t t t th v x xα δ − −∆ = −∆ + − .     (1) 
 
In (1) h is the log of the monetary base (the monetary policy instrument), α  is a constant term in-
tended to account for the steady-state nominal output growth, x  is the log of nominal output, av∆  is 
the moving average rate of growth of monetary base velocity over the previous four years, and *tx  is 
the target value of tx  for period t ; ∆  is the difference operator;δ is a feedback coefficient inform-
ing on how  quickly deviations of  output from i ts target are offset by the central bank. McCallum 
(1987) finds that for the United States a rule like (1) would have been more suitable, in terms of a 
smoother GNP path, if it had been in practice during 1954-1985. He reaches those conclusions after 
comparing simulations using (1) with actual policy reactions.  
McCallum’s rule is operational, as monetary base is under complete control of the central 
banker, and the variables on the right hand side of (1) are all known to the policy maker at period t. 
The information advantage stands in contrast to the Taylor rule where nominal interest rates are set 
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as a f unction of  c urrent period i nflation a nd t he output g ap – the la tter v ariable is  generally not  
known at period t, at least if GDP data are used in its construction.  
McCallum’s rule is relevant in an environment of deflation and with a zero bound on inter-
est r ates. In t hat e nvironment m onetary b ase growth m ay pr ovide i mportant i nformation even i f 
nominal policy rates are zero -McCallum (2003) studies the rule’s recommendation for base money 
growth during Japan’s deflation in the 1990s. Base money also has a role in signalling commitment 
in t he opt imal pol icy de scribed b y E ggertsson a nd W oodford ( 2003) a t t he z ero bound. 4 That is  
relevant since during the sample under study some emerging countries display declining policy in-
terest rates.5
 
  
3.2 Nominal monetary policy feedback rule (NFR) 
 
The pa per also c onsiders a  m echanism of  t he f orm ( see D ueker a nd Fischer, 1998;  M cCallum, 
1999) 
 
tttt yyyzz )()(
*
110 −+−∆+=∆ − δδ .     (2) 
In equation (2), z is a  pol icy ins trument or  int ermediate ta rget assumed to be controllable b y the 
monetary authorities; y and *y are the hypothesised nominal target and its reference value; 0δ is the 
baseline r ate of  growth of  the  nom inal ta rget; 1δ is a f eedback pa rameter w hich indicates how  
swiftly the monetary authorities respond to gaps between the actual and desired levels of the nomi-
nal t arget variable; and 1)( −−∆ ttyz  is a  forecast o f the  relationship amongst the  nominal target 
and the instrument; ∆ denotes the difference operator. A major advantage of a NFR like (2) is that it 
does not depend on real aggregate economic activity variables. Such variables, in particular for the 
case of developing economies, are sometimes not available at relatively high (quarterly or monthly) 
frequencies, and are usually wrongly measured. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Even if the central bank missed its price level target, it would supply the amount of money that would be demanded if 
the price level had been met.   
5 In June 2009 the Czech Republic’s policy rate was 1.5%, Thailand’s 1.25%, and Israel’s 0.5%.   
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3.3 Taylor’s rule 
 
Taylor’s (1993) rule advocates setting the US federal funds rate ( i ) in relation to the rate of infla-
tion ( π ), a n e quilibrium r eal f unds r ate ( *r ), pl us a n e venly w eighted a verage of  t wo ga ps: t he 
four-quarter moving average of the actual inflation rate given by the GDP deflator less a target rate 
( *π ), and the percent deviation of real GDP from an estimate of its  potential level ( y ). Taylor’s 
rule incorporates monetary policy’s key objectives. In equation form Taylor’s rule is 
 
)(5.0)(5.1 ** tttt yri +−++= πππ .     (3) 
Taylor’s original paper proceeds assuming the weights on inflation and output. But Taylor’s linear 
feedback rule has subsequently been shown to arise from solving the problem that a  pol icymaker 
faces in theoretical optimal monetary policy models. The Taylor principle, meaning that the nomi-
nal policy interest rate moves more than one-for-one with inflation, is a fundamental aspect leading 
to stability in theoretical models (e.g., Woodford, 2001; Davig and Leeper, 2007).  
Subsequent m odelling i nvestigates ( 3) e mpirically. Basically, t his lite rature e stimates 
monetary policy’s reactions to inflation and output gaps, and it considers lags on the central bank’s 
interest rate to account for instrument smoothing. Clarida et al (1998) model forward-looking Tay-
lor-type monetary policy reaction functions for France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US. 
See also the contributions in Taylor (1999).  
The pa per es timates T aylor-type i nterest r ate f eedback rules f or t he i nflation targeting 
countries in the sample; section 2 and Table 1 contain further details on the inflation targeting coun-
tries. Inflation targeting as a pol icy framework does not necessitate any mechanical rule-based ap-
proach to hit announced target. Svensson (1999) studies an implicit rule for inflation targeting that 
is close to Taylor’s6
The Taylor rule in the paper l inks the pol icy interest rate to the contemporaneous output 
gap and inflation. But a ssuming a  lag in the impact f rom the output gap to inflation introduces a  
forward-looking element to the policy rule: the policy maker may be reacting to future price pres-
. The mechanism in Svensson adjusts the short-term interest rate on the basis of 
the average nominal interest rate and the deviation of a conditional inflation forecast from an infla-
tion target.  
                                                 
6 Svensson ( 1999) s hows h ow monetary targeting c ould b e im plemented within a n in flation ta rgeting strategy. T he 
framework implies a  frequent adjustment o f the money s tock such that the interest rate is compatible with the future 
inflation target.  
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sures originating from an increasing output gap. The lag it takes the output gap to hit inflation is a 
common f eature of  s mall m acro m odels us ed f or a nalysing m onetary policy ( see, f or e xample, 
Carlin and Soskice, 2005).  
 
 
4 Data and empirical model specifications 
 
4.1 Data 
 
The s tudy employs qua rterly time s eries d ata. The nom inal int erest r ates us ed in estimating the 
benchmark Taylor rule and the hybrid McCallum-Taylor counterpart are the official policy interest 
rates listed in Table 1. T he rate of inflation is the annual change in the price index. The exchange 
rate variable in the entire family of rules is the annual change in the price of domestic currency per 
US dol lar. The output gap i s based on G DP data and section 5 f urther d iscusses i ts computation. 
The sources for all the data are central bank websites, the International Monetary Fund’s Interna-
tional Financial Statistics, and the CEIC database. Table 2 explains the notation and data transfor-
mations for the variables feeding the family of rules in the paper. 
 
4.2 Specifying the reaction functions 
 
In the spirit of McCallum (2000), the paper estimates a family of rules mixing targets and instru-
ments from the prevalent frameworks for analysing monetary policy performance. The battery of 
specifications in the empirical modelling are: 
 
( ) ( ) tTtttTt eyyRR ∆+−+−+= − δλππβϕ ~*1  Taylor (4) 
( ) tMTtttMTt exxRR ∆+∆−∆+= −− δρϕ 1*1  Hybrid McCallum-Taylor (5) 
( ) tMtttMt exxbb ∆+∆−∆+∆=∆ −− δθµ 1*1  McCallum  (6) 
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( ) tHMttttHMt eypbb ∆++∆−+∆=∆ − δπχµ

1  
Hybrid  
McCallum-Hall-Mankiw  
(7) 
( )
( )( ) ( ) tDFttDFtttt
ttt
epmm
pmm
∆+−+−∆−∆
=−∆−∆
−−
−
δππβω
11
1
 
NFR  
McCallum-Dueker-Fisher  
(8) 
 
The lagged policy instrument is an important feature in equations (4) to (8) and is intended to ac-
count for smoothing by the monetary authorities via the coefficients ϕT, ϕMT, µM, µHM, and ω (see 
English et al, 2003). Equation (4) is the benchmark Taylor-type monetary policy reaction function. 
Following the discussions in Taylor (2001), the arguments in Svensson (2000), and the large em-
pirical literature on monetary policy in open economies (e.g., Morón and Winkelried, 2005), equa-
tion (4) and the other specifications allow for feedback from the exchange rate. The exchange rate 
variable is the annual depreciation of the exchange rate expressed in percentage points, and an in-
crease in e is a depreciation. In equation (4) an increase in the exchange rate  is expected to produce 
an increase in the interest rate (δT  > 0) if the monetary authorities lean against the wind.  
The output gap i s based on H odrick-Prescott f iltered GDP da ta.7 The paper uses revised 
data available at the end of the sample, and does not make an attempt at measuring policy makers’ 
reactions to real time output data.8
As mentioned in the previous section, according to the Taylor principle the nominal policy 
interest should move one-for-one with inflation (β > 0). 
  The coefficient on the output gap is expected to be positive (λ  > 
0), indicating that the central bank increases the interest rate in actual output is above potential out-
put.  
Equation (5) is  a hybrid mixing an interest rate instrument with a McCallum nominal in-
come gap target a nd an exchange r ate va riable. An i mportant va riable i n t he r ule i s t he nom inal 
GDP target. For inflation targeting countries the nominal income target is computed by applying the 
                                                 
7 In addressing the end-of-sample problem associated with the filter, we calculate six out-of-sample forecasts based on 
an AR(1) model for the GDP series in first differences, and apply the filter to the constructed longer GDP series in lev-
els terms. 
8 Orphanides (2003) shows how the overestimation of potential output gave the Fed policy an inflationary bias during 
the 1970s. But Orphanides and van Norden (2002) investigate the consequences of using real-time measures of the out-
put gap for the US: the findings from the exercises do not provide superior insights for that economy. 
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HP filter to the real GDP data and taking the growth rates of the resulting trend series, and adding 
this measure of real trend growth to the inflation target announced by the central bank. An increase 
in the nominal income gap should lead to a reduction in the interest rate, that is ρ < 0; in equation 
(5) an increase in the exchange rate should lead the central bank to react by increasing the interest 
rate (δMT > 0). 
Analysing countries that do not target inflation explicitly involves computing the nominal 
income target by applying the HP filter to the nominal GDP data and taking the growth rates of the 
resulting trend series, once more abstracting from cyclical fluctuations in nominal output. In model-
ling the G7 economies McCallum and Hargraves (1994) use the average growth rate for real GDP 
over several decades and an inflation target of 2 percent per annum. Whereas the G7 are advanced 
economies, emerging economies often experience rapid structural change and potential growth rates 
are time-variant even during a short time frame.  
Equation (6) i s McCallum’s benchmark feedback mechanism including an exchange rate 
variable (δM  < 0). Equation (7) is a hybrid mixing a monetary base instrument with a target follow-
ing Hall and Mankiw (1994). The hybrid target is specified as the deviation of annual inflation from 
its moving average and an output gap. In equations (6) and (7) an increase in the McCallum and in 
Hall-Mankiw targets should lead to a reduction in the monetary base, i.e. a tightening of the mone-
tary policy stance; so θ < 0 and χ < 0 are expected. In the reaction functions with a monetary base 
instrument the coefficients on the exchange rate are expected to be negative (δM <  0 and δHM <  0) 
if the central bank tightens its policy stance following a depreciation. 
Equation (8) is a nominal feedback rule following Duecker and Fisher’s (1996) analysis of 
monetary pol icy in Switzerland. The a nalysis in this pa per e stimates the  va riable 
1)( −−∆ ttpm , 
which amounts to a technical approximation to the internal predictions a central bank is supposed to 
generate and use when designing its policy. In generating that variable the paper estimates a struc-
tural time series model from which a data sequence is generated for all the points in the given sam-
ple through the application of a Kalman filter. In producing the series 
1)( −−∆ ttpm  the analysis only 
uses information available up to the period t - 1 (Harvey, 1989). In equation (8) the coefficients βDF 
and δDF are expected to be negative if  the  monetary authorities b ring the  impl icit inf lation target 
down following a increase in the inflation gap or a depreciation in the exchange rate. 
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5  Estimating the monetary policy reaction functions 
 
5.1 Interest rate reaction functions for inflation targeting economies 
 
Table 3 reports OLS estimates of Taylor-type reaction functions (equation 4) for the inflation target-
ing countries. The most important common element of policy behaviour in this group of estimates is 
instrument smoothing, showing high and statistically significant coefficients on lagged policy rates 
(English et al, 2003). Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) argue that gradualism in policy is character-
istic of inflation targeting countries. The limited statistical significance of the inflation gap coeffi-
cient is unexpected given the success in disinflationary process in these economies.  
The analysis also estimates equation (4) using the generalised method of moments (GMM) 
estimator and the results are reported in Table 3a. The instrument set for the GMM estimates con-
tains lags 2 and 3 o f the interest rate, and lags 1 and 2 of  the inflation gap, the output gap, the ex-
change rate, and oil prices. The over-identifying restrictions for the set of instruments cannot be re-
jected for any economy in the sample in the entire family of rules.9
In economies for which the exchange rate variable is statistically significant it always car-
ries the expected positive sign, excepting Peru. Israel’s estimates point to strong responses to both 
inflation gap and the exchange rate. But Israel has also experienced deflation during the estimation 
sample.
 The GMM estimates show that 
the coefficient on the inflation gap is statistically significant and positive in 5 e conomies, and the 
same hol ds f or t he out put g ap c oefficient i n 7 c ountries. C hile i s t he o nly e conomy di splaying 
strong interest rate responses to the inflation gap and to the output gap. Figure 1 displays the actual 
path of the monetary policy interest rate and the inflation gap in Chile, showing a close relationship. 
10
The insignificance of the exchange rate in Chile is a relevant result: it can be interpreted as 
the success of its monetary authorities in consolidating the inflation targeting regime. The reason is 
that from the mid-1980s unt il August 1999 t he Central Bank of  Chile had an exchange rate band 
regime in place. The estimations in the paper only span the formal post-1999 inflation targeting af-
  
                                                 
9 In the estimations where base money is the policy variable the monetary base replaces the interest rate in the instru-
ment set.  
10 Benhabib, S chmitt-Grohé a nd U ribe ( 2001) t heoretically show t he undesirable pos sibility that T aylor-rules c ould 
drive the economy into a liquidity trap through self-fulfilling deflationary paths. 
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ter which the authorities have made clear that the primary objective is achieving the pre-announced 
inflation target.11
Mexico displays no significant response to the inflation gap and only a weakly significant 
reaction to the output gap. The estimated reaction function for South Korea indicates ‘leaning with 
the wind’ behavior, but the economy has managed to keep its inflation gap relatively low. 
 
The pa per e xplores t he pos sibility t hat t he be haviour of  inf lation targeting e merging 
economies is better described using a hybrid McCallum-Taylor policy reaction function mixing an 
interest rate instrument with a nominal income target (equation 5). Tables 4 a nd 4a show the OLS 
and the GMM es timates for the h ybrid McCallum-Taylor reaction function. For most economies, 
we obtain the expected coefficient on the nominal income gap – a fall in nominal GDP growth with 
respect to its target implies a reduction in policy interest rates. In the GMM estimations the coeffi-
cient is statistically significant and negative in 10 countries.  
The benchmark Taylor reaction function does not carry the expected sign for the inflation 
gap and  the exchange rate for Peru, but the anomaly i s cor rected in the hybrid specification. The 
hybrid reaction functions further produce higher or equivalent R squared values for most economies 
under study, although the differences are not large. The results provide evidence that, on a verage, 
the be haviour of  t he i nflation t argeting e merging economies can be be tter c aptured by a h ybrid 
McCallum-Taylor rule than by the benchmark Taylor-type reaction function.  
The limited significance of the inflation target in the benchmark Taylor-rules could reflect 
the be nign m acroeconomic e nvironment t hat h as a llowed f or a  di sinflationary process w ithout a 
strong s tabilizing reaction f rom the monetary authority. However, there i s evidence of  s tabilizing 
monetary policy in the hybrid McCallum-Taylor estimates where the nominal income gap is often 
significant. The importance of the exchange rate is limited even for those inflation targeters that are 
most open in terms of international trade (Czech Republic, Hungary, Thailand), and that arguably 
reflects the successful consolidation of the inflation targeting regimes.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia (2002) estimate a Taylor-type reaction function for Chile using time series data ranging 
from 1991 to 2001. Amongst other findings, Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia reveal that the central bank increases monetary 
policy’s interest rate following an exchange rate depreciation. 
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5.2 Monetary base reaction functions 
 
Tables 5 and 6 report OLS and GMM estimates for the two rules with monetary base as the central 
bank’s pol icy variable ( equations 6 and 7) . T he r esults f rom r unning a  McCallum-type r ule, r e-
ported in Table 5, s how that Uruguay and  Venezuela follow a pol icy whereby an increase in the 
nominal i ncome g ap i s met w ith a n i ncrease i n m onetary ba se, i .e. t he c entral ba nk i s l eaning 
against the wind. Uruguay displays an estimated coefficient on the nominal income gap quite close 
to the value of 0.5 employed by McCallum in modelling Japan and the US (e.g. McCallum, 2003). 
The finding holds for the OLS and GMM estimates, and it is also true for Venezuela in the case of 
the OLS estimation. But the GMM estimate for Venezuela shows deviations from the target nomi-
nal income path are met with a relatively strong movement in the monetary base, significantly ex-
ceeding the McCallum-proposed value of  0.5. T he s trong reactions could be destabilizing for the 
economy.  
Instrument smoothing is significant in the estimates for the four economies. The reaction of 
base money to the exchange rate is less important in the case of the McCallum-type rules than in its 
McCallum-Hall-Mankiw variant. In the case of the GMM estimates, only Costa Rica displays a sta-
tistically s ignificant reaction to the exchange rate that is  accommodative -exchange rate deprecia-
tions are met with an increase in base money. 
Running the McCallum-Hall-Mankiw reaction functions reveal base money growth reac-
tions with a statistically significant and positive coefficient to the hybrid gap in the case of Malaysia 
and Uruguay, suggesting that policy is accommodative. In the case of Venezuela the sign on the hy-
brid gap coefficient is negative, with a relatively high coefficient estimate, indicating a strong stabi-
lizing reaction. Instrument smoothing is important in all other cases except for Malaysia. Monetary 
base growth’s reaction to the exchange rate is statistically significant only in the case of Malaysia 
and Uruguay, with opposite s igns12
Comparing the two reaction functions with base money growth as the policy instrument is 
expected to reveal that the estimated coefficients on the nominal income gap (Table 5) and on the 
hybrid target (Table 6) carry opposite signs: such is the case for the GMM estimates for all coun-
tries excepting Uruguay. Further comparing the two tables, only Venezuela seems to be consistently 
. Malaysia, where an appreciation in the exchange r ate i s met 
with expansionary dom estic monetary pol icy i n both t he McCallum and McCallum-Hall-Mankiw 
variants, is the most open amongst the four economies studied.  
                                                 
12 Malaysia had a dollar peg until 2005, so the paper also runs the reaction functions using a nominal effective exchange 
rate. The only difference arising from the exercises is that lagged policy variable becomes significant in the McCallum-
Hall-Mankiw specification.  
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pursuing a policy of leaning against the wind, no matter how the target variable is specified. Such a 
reading would be possible also in the case of Uruguay on the basis of the McCallum-estimates, but 
its monetary base is positively associated with an increase in the hybrid Hall-Mankiw gap.  
 
5.3 Nominal feedback rules 
 
The paper estimates the historical behaviour of the monetary authorities in Ghana, Nigeria, and Tu-
nisia employing a nominal monetary policy feedback rule (NFR) incorporating an implicit inflation 
targeting m echanism. The NFR i s an alternative McCallum-type rule (see McCallum, 1999) . The 
results in Table 7 reveal that the central banks of Ghana and Nigeria have, on average, pursued ac-
commodative policies: the implicit inflation target increases when inflation is above the trend level. 
So the central banks display lean with the wind biases. 
Ghana’s a doption of  a  formal i nflation t argeting r egime h ad a ne gative and statistically 
significant impact on the implicit inflation target variable, and that can be interpreted as a successful 
introduction of the new policy regime. Figure 2 shows the results from running exercises using the 
NFR e stimated for G hana in  forecasting i nflation a fter t he i ntroduction of f ully-fledged i nflation 
targeting in May 2007. The figure shows that the forecasts over-predict the implicit inflation target, 
which can serve as a measure of the new regime’s success in bringing down inflation. 
The outcomes of the empirical exercises for Ghana and Nigeria are sensible, given the de-
gree of  dependence that the cent ral banks of  these count ries have hi storically had on the govern-
ment’s r equirements. T he f act t hat r esponses l ike t hose of  a n i mplicit i nflation targeting r egime 
cannot be consistently found for both countries should be considered in the light of the rules versus 
discretion debate (Kydland and Prescott, 1977), and the literature on c entral bank (non) independ-
ence springing from Alesina and Summers (1993).  
Tunisia, however, displays results signalling that the central bank leans against the wind: 
the coefficient on the inflation gap and on the exchange rate depreciation i s negative. The coeffi-
cients imply that the monetary authorities tighten the policy stance when inflation is above its trend 
and when the exchange rate is depreciating. The results reflect a commitment to improving policy 
outcomes. 
 
 
Aaron Mehrotra and José R. Sánchez-Fung 
 
Assessing McCallum and Taylor rules  
in a cross-section of emerging market economies 
 
 
 20 
6 Conclusion 
 
The paper investigates monetary policy behaviour in emerging market economies. The analysis em-
pirically estimates McCallum and Taylor monetary policy reaction functions for 20 economies im-
plementing diverse monetary policy strategies.  The modelling finds that the behaviour of the infla-
tion targeting e conomies is  be tter c aptured with a h ybrid McCallum-Taylor r ule i ncorporating a  
nominal income target than with a benchmark Taylor-type rule. Countries pursuing a mix of mone-
tary and exchange r ate t argets por tray di fferences i n the r eaction of pol icy t o domestic t argets -
output gap, inflation gap, or a nominal income target- and the exchange rate.  
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Table 1  Monetary policy regimes in selected emerging countries 
  
Country Period Monetary policy strategies 
Inflation target and 
range  
1 Chile* 
1991-1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From 1999 
Target from 1991, announced in September 
1990 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Full IT  
Interest rate: MPR is the policy rate 
CPI  
1991: 15%-20% 
1992: 13%-16% 
1993: 10%-12% 
1994: 9%-11% 
1995: ±8% 
1996: ±6.5% 
1997: ±5.5% 
1998: ±4.5% 
Since 1999:  
3% ±1%  
2 Colombia 1999-present IT  Interest rate: overnight rate 
CPI  
2007 and 2008: 3.5% 
and 4.5% 
2009:  
3.0% and 3.5% 
3 Costa Rica From No-vember 1995 
Price and exchange rate stability/Crawling 
peg exchange rate regime.  
Interest rate: bonos de estabilización moneta-
ria 6 meses (BME) 
- 
4 Czech Rep. December 1997-present 
IT 
Interest rate: 2 week repo rate 
Net inflation 
1998: 5.5%-6.5% 
1999: 4%-5% 
2000: 3.5%-5.5% 
2001: 2%-4% 
CPI target band 2002-
2005: moving from  
3-5% to 2%-4% 
2006-2009:  
CPI 3% 
5 Ghana 
From 2002 
 
From May 
2007 
Implicit IT 
 
 
Full IT 
CPI excluding energy 
and utility 
6 Hungary 
Mar 1995 – 
May 2001 
 
 
 
June 2001-
present 
Crawling peg 
 
 
 
 
IT 
CPI 
2001: 7% ±1%  
2002: 4.5% ±1%  
2003-2004 :  
3.5% ±1% 
2005: 4% ±1%  
2006: 3.5% ±1%  
Since 2007 : 3% 
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7 Israel 1992-present IT Interest rate: headline rate (simple) 
CPI 
1992: 14–15% 
1993: 10% 
1994: 8% 
1995: 8%–11% 
1996: 8%–10% 
1997: 7%–10% 
1998: 7%–10% 
1999: 4% 
2000: 3%-4% 
2001: 2.5%–3.5% 
2002: 2%–3% 
Since 2003:  
1%-3% 
8 Malaysia 
1976-1992 
1993-1998 
Sep 1998-Jul 
2005 
Jul 2005-
present 
Peg to composite basket 
Managed float 
 
Peg to USD 
 
Managed float 
- 
 
9 Mexico* 
1987-1991 
 
 
1991-1994 
 
1995-1998 
 
 
1999-2001  
 
 
2001-present 
 
Pacto programme 
Pegged exchange rate policy 
 
Exchange rate band 
 
Monetary targeting, since 1995 corto 
quantitative operating target 
 
IT light 
 
Full IT  
Interest rate: 28-day CETES 
From January 2008: interest rate target 
CPI 
1999: 13% 
2000: <10% 
Since 2001: 3% 
10 Nigeria 1974 to pre-sent 
Monetary targeting (1974-92 direct control; 
indirect control from 1993) 
Interest- and exchange-rate controls in the 
1970s and 1980s 
Market determined interest rates from 1986, 
alongside financial deregulation 
From 1996 full deregulation of interest rates 
Interest rate: policy rate is MPR 
- 
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11 Peru 
From 1994  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January  
2002 
 
 
 
Announced inflation targets. Monetary target-
ing 
 
 
 
Full IT 
Interest rate: overnight bank loans  
The Peruvian monetary strategy allows 
switching from targeting overnight interest 
rate to monetary aggregate due to dollariza-
tion and potential adverse balance sheet ef-
fects 
 
CPI 
2.5% ±1% 
12 Philippines 
1984-1995 
 
 
1995-2001 
 
2002-present 
Monetary targeting (with free float) 
 
 
IT light 
 
 
IT 
Interest rate: repo rate 
CPI 
2002-2003:  
4.5%-5.5% 
2004: 4%-5% 
2005: 5%-6% 
2006-2007:  
4%-5% 
2008: 4.0% ±1% 
13 Poland 
Until 1998 
 
 
 
 
 
From 1999-
present 
Combination of monetary targeting and 
crawling peg 
 
 
 
 
IT  
Interest rate: reference rate 
 
CPI 
1999: 6.6%-7.8% 
2000:  
5.4%-6.8% 
2001: 6%-8% 
2002: 5% ±1% 
2003: 3% ±1% 
Since 2004:  
2.5% ±1% 
14 South Africa 
From 1985 
 
 
 
 
 
From Febru-
ary  2000 
 
M3 monetary targeting 
During the 1990s: monetary policy package 
also looking at the exchange rate and bank 
credit  
 
 
 
Full IT; monitoring of M3 as an information 
variable in the IT framework  
Targets announced in 2000 to be effective 
from 2002  
Interest rate: Discount rate 
CPIX (overall price 
index excluding the 
cost of changes in 
mortgage costs) 2002-
2003:  
3%-6% range  
2004: initially 3%- 5%, 
but changed to  
3%-6%  
Since 2005:  
3%-6% range 
15 South Korea 
March 
1990-Dec 
1997 
 
 
 
April 1998-
present 
Managed float (with monetary targeting) 
 
 
 
 
IT (with free float)  
Interest rate: base rate 
CPI 
1999: 3% ±1% 
2000: 2.5% ±1% 
2001-2003: 3%±1% 
2004-2006:  
2.5% ±3.5% 
2007-2009:  
3% ± 0.5% 
 
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 23/ 2009 
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16 Thailand 
November 
1984-Jun 
1997 
 
 
July 1997-
May 2000 
 
 
 
 
May 2000-
present 
Peg to currency basket 
 
 
Monetary targeting (with floating exchange 
rate) 
 
IT 
Interest rate: 14-day repo rate up until 16 
January 2007, after which 1-day repo rate 
Since 12 February 2008, 1-day bilateral repo 
rate 
Core inflation 
Since 2000:  
0%-3.5% 
 
17 Tunisia 1990s Monetary growth targeting/constant real ex-change rate rule - 
18 Turkey 
1981-Feb 
2001 
 
2002-2005 
 
2006-present 
Crawling peg 
 
 
Implicit IT (with float) 
 
 
IT 
Interest rate: overnight lending rate 
CPI 
2002: 35% 
2003: 20% 
2004: 12% 
2005: 8% 
2006: 5% 
Since 2007: 4% 
19 Uruguay 
Before 2002 
 
From 2002 
Exchange rate peg 
 
 
Flexible exchange rate 
- 
20 Venezuela 
1989-92 
 
 
 
 
1993-2002 
 
 
 
 
 
From 2002 
Flexible exchange rate/monetary  
targeting  
 
 
Price stability as primary objective 
 
 
 
 
Mix of monetary and inflation targets 
- 
 
Sources
 
: central banks’ web pages. * Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aaron Mehrotra and José R. Sánchez-Fung 
 
Assessing McCallum and Taylor rules  
in a cross-section of emerging market economies 
 
 
 28 
 
 
Table 2   Variables in the family of monetary policy reaction functions 
 
 
Variable Description Units 
Monetary policy instruments 
tR  Interest rate controlled by the monetary au-
thorities 
Percentage 
tb∆  Annual rate of change in the log of the mone-
tary base: 4−−=∆ ttt bbb  
Percent x 100 
( ) 1−−∆−∆ ttt pmm  Annual change in the log of the nominal 
monetary aggregate ( 4−−=∆ ttt mmm ) minus 
the predicted annual change in the real mone-
tary aggregate ∆ ( pm − ) using information 
available in the previous period 
Percent x 100 
Monetary policy targets 
( )*ππ −t  Inflation gap defined as the difference be-
tween a moving average of annual inflation, 
measured as 4−−= ttt ppπ , and the inflation 
target announced by the monetary authorities 
in inflation targeting economies  
Percent x 100 
( )yyt ~−  Output gap defined as deviations of log out-
put from trend log output computed using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter 
Percent x 100 
( )1* −∆−∆ tt xx  McCallum’s nominal income gap measure, expressed as the difference between the an-
nual change in the target nominal income and 
the annual change in the previous period’s 
annual nominal income. For the inflation tar-
geting economies is the sum of real output 
passed through the HP filter and the inflation 
target announced by the monetary authorities.  
Percent x 100 
( )ttt yp
+∆−π  Hybrid gap measure following Hall and Mankiw, expressed as deviations of annual 
inflation from its moving average and a 
measure of the real output gap 
Percent x 100 
te∆  Annual change in the log of the nominal ex-
change rate 
Percent x 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Taylor-type reaction functions for inflation targeting economies, OLS 
 
The dependent variable is R (%) 
Countries 
 
Coefficients 
Chile 
99Q2-07Q3 
Colombia 
00Q1-07Q3 
Czech 
Republic 
98Q1-08Q3 
Hungary 
02Q1-08Q3 
Israel 
96Q1-08Q4 
Mexico 
99Q1-07Q3 
Peru 
02Q1-07Q1 
Inflation gap  
*
tt   (%):  
0.44 
(0.28) 
-0.18 
(0.33) 
-0.09 
(0.09) 
0.36 
(0.37) 
0.16* 
(0.09) 
-0.24 
(0.30) 
-0.32 
(0.61) 
Real output gap 
tt yy
~ (%):  
0.23*** 
(0.07) 
0.09 
(0.17) 
0.26** 
(0.10) 
0.04 
(0.16) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.42* 
(0.22) 
0.28** 
(0.12) 
Exchange rate 
te (%): T 
0.009 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.029) 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
Lagged policy rate 
1tR (%): T 
0.64*** 
(0.19) 
0.75*** 
(0.12) 
0.94*** 
(0.06) 
0.80*** 
(0.14) 
0.86*** 
(0.05) 
0.77*** 
(0.09) 
0.12 
(0.54) 
2R  0.85 0.88 0.97 0.68 0.95 0.95 0.66 
 
 
Table 3 continued… 
 
Countries 
 
Coefficients 
Philippines 
02Q1-08Q3 
Poland 
01Q1-08Q3 
South Africa 
01Q1-07Q3 
South Korea 
00Q1-08Q3 
Thailand 
02Q4-08Q3 
Turkey 
02Q3-07Q4 
Inflation gap  
*
tt   (%):  
0.14** 
(0.05) 
0.19 
(0.15) 
0.005 
(0.09) 
-0.21** 
(0.08) 
0.25*** 
(0.07) 
0.25 
(0.17) 
Real output gap 
tt yy
~ (%):  
-0.02 
(0.19) 
0.25* 
(0.13) 
0.50 
(0.40) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.10 
(0.10) 
0.06 
(0.57) 
Exchange rate 
te (%): T  
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.10** 
(0.04) 
Lagged policy rate 
1tR (%): T 
0.68** 
(0.16) 
0.83*** 
(0.04) 
0.93*** 
(0.11) 
0.83*** 
(0.10) 
0.83*** 
(0.09) 
0.82*** 
(0.16) 
2R  0.77 0.98 0.91 0.92 0.97 0.98 
Notes on Table 3: OLS ordinary least squares. Coefficients’ significance is determined using jackknife heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors displayed inside 
parentheses (MacKinnon and White, 1985). ***, ** and * denote coefficient significance at the 1, 5 and 10 levels, respectively.  
Table 3a Taylor-type reaction functions for inflation targeting economies, GMM 
 
The dependent variable is R (%) 
Countries 
 
Coefficients 
Chile 
99Q2-07Q3 
Colombia 
00Q1-07Q3 
Czech 
Republic 
98Q1-08Q3 
Hungary 
02Q1-08Q3 
Israel 
96Q1-08Q4 
Mexico 
99Q1-07Q3 
Peru 
02Q1-07Q1 
Inflation gap  
*
tt    (%):  
0.46*** 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.25) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
0.21 
(0.14) 
0.12** 
(0.05) 
-0.16 
(0.13) 
-0.64*** 
(0.18) 
Real output gap 
tt yy
~ (%):  
0.38*** 
(0.05) 
0.41** 
(0.15) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.16) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.20* 
(0.11) 
0.24*** 
(0.04) 
Exchange rate 
te (%): T 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.029) 
0.12*** 
(0.01) 
0.10*** 
(0.03) 
-0.08*** 
(0.02) 
Lagged policy rate 
1tR (%): T 
0.68*** 
(0.19) 
0.68*** 
(0.05) 
1.00*** 
(0.05) 
0.46** 
(0.21) 
0.83*** 
(0.03) 
0.91*** 
(0.05) 
0.003 
(0.14) 
2R  0.81 0.86 0.90 0.38 0.93 0.93 0.68 
J-statistic 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.19 0.12 0.10 0.18 
 
Table 3a continued… 
Countries 
 
Coefficients 
Philippines 
02Q1-08Q3 
Poland 
01Q1-08Q3 
South Africa 
01Q1-07Q3 
South Korea 
00Q1-08Q3 
Thailand 
02Q4-08Q3 
Turkey 
02Q3-07Q4 
Inflation gap  
*
tt   (%):  
0.19*** 
(0.02) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
-0.11*** 
(0.02) 
-0.34*** 
(0.03) 
0.39*** 
(0.10) 
0.54*** 
(0.02) 
Real output gap 
tt yy
~  (%):  
-0.64*** 
(0.09) 
0.36*** 
(0.04) 
0.84*** 
(0.24) 
0.11*** 
(0.01) 
-0.32*** 
(0.11) 
-1.29*** 
(0.16) 
Exchange rate 
te (%): T  
0.02*** 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
0.02*** 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
0.11*** 
(0.008) 
Lagged policy rate 
1tR (%): T 
0.59*** 
(0.04) 
0.94*** 
(0.01) 
1.14*** 
(0.02) 
0.67*** 
(0.05) 
0.47*** 
(0.12) 
0.39*** 
(0.03) 
2R  0.61 0.98 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.98 
J-statistic 0.17 0.12 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.20 
Notes on Table 3a: GMM generalized method of moments. The instruments are lags 2 and 3 of the interest rate, and lags 1 and 2 of the inflation gap, the output gap,  
the exchange rate, and oil prices. ***, ** and * denote coefficient significance at the 1, 5 and 10 levels, respectively. The J-statistic tests the validity of the over-identifying 
 restrictions for the GMM estimations.  
 
 
Table 4  Hybrid McCallum-Taylor monetary policy reaction functions for inflation targeting economies, OLS 
 
The dependent variable is R (%) 
 
Countries 
 
Coefficients 
Chile 
99Q2-07Q3 
Colombia 
00Q1-07Q3 
Czech 
Republic 
98Q1-08Q3 
Hungary 
02Q1-08Q3 
Israel 
96Q1-08Q4 
Mexico 
99Q1-07Q3 
Peru 
02Q1-07Q1 
Nominal income gap 
1
*
 tt xx  (%):  
-0.09*** 
(0.06) 
-0.24*** 
(0.07) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.11* 
(0.07) 
-0.10** 
(0.04) 
-0.14 
(0.08) 
-0.11*** 
(0.03) 
Exchange rate    
te (%): MT  
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.008) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
0.12 
(0.07) 
Lagged policy rate 
1tR (%): MT 
0.86*** 
(0.08) 
0.76*** 
(0.11) 
0.85*** 
(0.06) 
0.74*** 
(0.10) 
0.88*** 
(0.04) 
0.80*** 
(0.06) 
0.43 
(0.23)* 
2R  0.86 0.91 0.97 0.70 0.95 0.94 0.60 
Countries 
 
Coefficients 
Philippines 
02Q1-08Q3 
Poland 
01Q1-08Q3 
South Africa 
01Q1-07Q3 
South Korea 
00Q1-08Q3 
Thailand 
00Q4-08Q3 
Turkey 
02Q3-07Q4 
Nominal income gap 
1
*
 tt xx  (%):  
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.20** 
(0.08) 
-0.14* 
(0.08) 
0.008 
(0.02) 
-0.11*** 
(0.02) 
0.002 
(0.119) 
Exchange rate    
te (%): MT 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.01* 
(0.007) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.12** 
(0.05) 
Lagged policy rate 
1tR (%): MT 
0.76** 
(0.14) 
0.92*** 
(0.05) 
0.83*** 
(0.06) 
1.09** 
(0.08) 
0.95*** 
(0.04) 
0.85*** 
(0.04) 
2R  0.71 0.98 0.91 0.90 0.95 0.98 
Notes on Table 4: OLS ordinary least squares. Coefficients’ significance is determined using jackknife heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors displayed inside 
parentheses (MacKinnon and White, 1985). ***, ** and * denote coefficient significance at the 1, 5 and 10 levels, respectively. 
 Table 4a Hybrid McCallum-Taylor monetary policy reaction functions for inflation targeting economies, GMM 
The dependent variable is R (%) 
Countries 
Coefficients 
Chile 
99Q2-07Q3 
Colombia 
00Q1-07Q3 
Czech 
Republic 
98Q1-08Q3 
Hungary 
02Q1-08Q3 
Israel 
96Q1-08Q4 
Mexico 
99Q1-07Q3 
Peru 
02Q1-07Q1 
Nominal income gap 
1
*
 tt xx (%):  
-0.11** 
(0.04) 
-0.23*** 
(0.02) 
-0.09** 
(0.03) 
-0.18*** 
(0.03) 
-0.07 
(0.04) 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
-0.16*** 
(0.01) 
Exchange rate   
te (%): MT 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.47) 
0.07*** 
(0.01) 
Lagged policy rate 
1tR  (%): MT 
1.01*** 
(0.07) 
0.72*** 
(0.04) 
0.91*** 
(0.04) 
0.69*** 
(0.04) 
0.83*** 
(0.02) 
0.84*** 
(0.03) 
0.29*** 
(0.08) 
2R  0.61 0.90 0.94 0.68 0.94 0.92 0.40 
J-statistic 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.15 
Countries 
 
Coefficients 
Philippines 
02Q1-08Q3 
Poland 
01Q1-08Q3 
South Africa 
01Q1-07Q3 
South Korea 
00Q1-08Q3 
Thailand 
00Q4-08Q3 
Turkey 
02Q3-07Q4 
Nominal income gap 
1
*
 tt xx (%):  
-0.15** 
(0.06) 
-0.23*** 
(0.04) 
-0.16*** 
(0.03) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.13*** 
(0.02) 
-0.27*** 
(0.07) 
Exchange rate   
 te (%): MT 
0.01** 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Lagged policy rate 
1tR (%): MT 
0.95*** 
(0.05) 
0.99*** 
(0.01) 
0.91*** 
(0.02) 
-1.15*** 
(0.09) 
0.80*** 
(0.05) 
0.86*** 
(0.02) 
2R  0.71 0.98 0.91 0.87 0.93 0.96 
J-statistic 0.14 0.09 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.24 
Notes on Table 4a:  GMM generalized method of moments. The instruments are lags 2 and 3 of the interest rate, and lags 1 and 2 of the nominal output gap, the exchange rate,  
and oil prices. ***, ** and * denote coefficient significance at the 1, 5 and 10 levels, respectively. The J-statistic tests the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 McCallum-type reaction functions, OLS and GMM 
 
The dependent variable is the rate of change of the monetary base ( b ) (%) 
 
                                
Countries 
Coefficients 
Costa Rica 
00Q1-07Q2 
Malaysia 
01Q1-08Q3 
Uruguay 
01Q1-07Q1 
Venezuela 
02Q1-07Q4 
Nominal income gap 
1
*
 tt xx  (%):  
OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
-2.25** 
(1.09) 
-1.97* 
(1.11) 
-0.29* 
(0.15) 
-0.02 
(0.20) 
0.44* 
(0.22) 
0.63*** 
(0.14) 
0.63** 
(0.28) 
1.03*** 
(0.24) 
Exchange rate 
te (%): M 
0.72 
(0.78) 
0.79** 
(0.32) 
 -0.57*** 
(0.19) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
-0.05 
(0.16) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
-0.21 
(0.24) 
0.17 
(0.12) 
Lagged policy instrument 
1 tb (%): M 
    0.57*** 
(0.11) 
   1.14*** 
(0.14) 
0.19* 
(0.10) 
1.45*** 
(0.31) 
  0.70*** 
(0.12) 
0.49*** 
(0.09) 
0.91*** 
(0.14) 
0.84*** 
(0.09) 
 2R  0.77 0.58 0.50 -0.35 0.63 0.56 0.72 0.51 
J-statistic - 0.13 - 0.09 - 0.17  0.15 
Notes on Table 5: OLS ordinary least squares. Coefficients’ significance is determined using jackknife heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors  
displayed inside parentheses (MacKinnon and White, 1985). For Venezuela the instrument is proxied by a narrow monetary aggregate. GMM generalized method of moments.  
The instruments are lags 2 and 3 of the monetary base, and lags 1 and 2 of the nominal income gap, the exchange rate, and oil prices. ***, ** and * denote coefficient significance  
at the 1, 5 and 10 levels, respectively. The J-statistic tests the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimations. 
Table 6  McCallum-Hall-Mankiw reaction functions, OLS and GMM 
 
The dependent variable is the rate of change of the monetary base ( b ) (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes on Table 6: OLS ordinary least squares. Coefficients’ significance is determined using jackknife heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors  
displayed inside parentheses (MacKinnon and White, 1985). For Venezuela the instrument is proxied by a narrow monetary aggregate. GMM generalized method of moments.  
The instruments are lags 2 and 3 of the monetary base, and lags 1 and 2 of the hybrid Hall-Mankiw target, the exchange rate, and oil prices. ***, ** and * denote coefficient significance  
at the 1, 5 and 10 levels, respectively. The J-statistic tests the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimations.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                Countries 
Coefficients 
Costa Rica 
00Q1-07Q2 
Malaysia 
01Q1-08Q3 
Uruguay 
01Q1-07Q1 
Venezuela 
02Q1-07Q4 
Hybrid target Hall-Mankiw 
ttt yp

  (%):   
OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
0.72 
(1.09) 
0.98 
(1.10) 
1.04** 
(0.39) 
1.39** 
(0.56) 
-0.47 
(0.96) 
2.28** 
(0.86) 
-1.25* 
(0.69) 
-3.89*** 
(0.87) 
Exchange rate 
te (%): HM 
0.66 
(0.83) 
-0.37 
(0.37) 
-0.68*** 
(0.22) 
-0.60** 
(0.22) 
0.06 
(0.14) 
0.33** 
(0.13) 
-0.27 
(0.22) 
-0.30 
(0.23) 
Lagged policy instrument 
1 tb (%): HM 
0.77*** 
(0.14) 
0.89*** 
(0.10) 
-0.12* 
(0.07) 
-0.07 
(0.41) 
0.83*** 
(0.09) 
0.64*** 
(0.12) 
0.96*** 
(0.14) 
0.80*** 
(0.14) 
 2R  0.71 0.61 0.37 0.39 0.72 0.21 0.72 0.27 
J-statistic - 0.17 - 0.14 - 0.10 - 0.16 
Table 7 McCallum-Dueker-Fischer nominal feedback equations, OLS 
 
The dependent variable is the implicit inflation target  
 
1 ttt pmm  (%) 
Countries 
 
Coefficients 
Ghana 
86Q1-06Q4 
Nigeria 
86Q1-06Q3 
Tunisia 
93Q3-07Q1 
 
Inflation gap  
*
tt   (%): βDF 
 
0.62*** 
(0.09) 
1.11*** 
(0.39) 
-7.96*** 
(1.56) 
 
Exchange rate 
te (%): DF 
 
0.08 
(0.08) 
- 
-1.23*** 
(0.22) 
 
Inflation targeting 
dummy from 2002 
 
-6.55** 
(2.63) 
- - 
 
2R  
 
0.63 0.66 0.75 
Notes on Table 7: OLS ordinary least squares. Coefficients’ significance is determined using standard errors displayed 
inside parentheses. ***, ** and * denote coefficient significance at the 1, 5 and 10 levels, respectively. The coefficients 
reported are the long-run solutions to autoregressive distributed lag models of order 4. All the solutions are valid according 
to the corresponding Wald tests. The real money demand forecast is computed using a STM and the Kalman filter. The 
reference inflation rate used in computing the inflation gap is the 16 quarter moving average of the inflation rate. 
 
 
Table A1 List of countries in the sample 
1. Chile 11. Peru 
2. Colombia 12. Philippines 
3. Costa Rica 13. Poland 
4. Czech Republic 14. South Africa 
5. Ghana 15. South Korea 
6. Hungary 16. Thailand 
7. Israel 17. Tunisia 
8. Malaysia 18. Turkey 
9. Mexico 19. Uruguay 
10. Nigeria 20. Venezuela 
 
 
Figure 1 Monetary policy interest rate and inflation gap in Chile 
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Figure 2  Forecasting the implicit inflation target in Ghana following inflation targeting adoption  
Two forecast error fans shown in the red shaded area 
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